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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE

May 11, 1971

have an all-volunteer army. We have
tried to discriminate against our own
citizens and their wives in a manner
that I cou.ld not imagine any country in
the world doing.
We have never gi ;n this a fair try.
Mr. President, I will have a little more
to say later. However, I conclude my
statement at this time.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum with the
proviso that I do not lose my right to
the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislath·e clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at
the present time there are over 300,000
U .S. military personnel, including 20,000 in the 6th Fleet, stationed in Westem Europe. Of this number, 128 are
general flag officers, or one teneral flag
officer for every 2,343 men.
That is an introductory statement.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may submit an amendment to
H.R. 6531, a bill to amend the Military
Selective Service Act of 1967; to increase
military pay; to authorize military active duty strengths for fiscal year 1972,
and for other purposes; and I further
ask unanimous consent that, after the
reading of the amendment-and I do
this with the approval of the authors of
the pending amendment-the Senate
proceed to its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, the amendment
offered by the Senator from Montanaand I only read it a few minutes ago-is a far-reaching matter. It is highly
important. It involves international policies. However, any Member might wish
to vote on it. I am sure most Members
want a thorough discussion and debate
on it. I would not be in a position to
agree now to make it the pending matter.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Would the Senator
mind withdrawing his amendment so
that I can offer my amendment and
then the Senator's amendment could
follow my amendment?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may I
be heard on that request?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand the
Senator from Pennsylvania has a right
to do so voluntarily if h e wishes to do
so.
Mr. STENNIS. Reserving the right to
objec~

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I suggest to the Senator from Pennsylvania
before he agrees to withdraw his amendment that there be time for a conference. I think the amendment of the
Senator from Pennsylvania. goes to the
very vitals of this entire bill. The major
part of the debate on it will affect thE?
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whole system of the Selective Service Act,
the entire military setup, and I welcome
the debate on it, and a vote on it. However, I really do not think it should be
set aside now and another amendment
brought up.
To that extent I appeal to the Senator
from Pennsylvania in the interest of
orderly procedure that he not withdraw
his amendment. He told me on Friday
and he told me this morning that he
wanted to bring up his amendment. I
had asked him not to at that time. I told
him I would let him know when the
committee had gotten near the point
of making its initial presentation. I notified him to that effect. I hope that now
he does not withdraw his amendment,
certainly until we can have a conference.
Mr. SCHWEIKER. Is the Senator
willing to have a conference on it now?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I will go ahead with
my speech while the Senators confer.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana is recognized.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, has
the amendment been read?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. It has
not been read.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask that the
amendment be read.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be read by the clerk.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I withdraw my request in view of the situation that developed, but I want the amendment read.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The request for the amendment to be offered
for purposes of parliamentary action is
withdrawn and the amendment will be
read for the information of the Senate.
The amendm~>nt was read, as follows:
At the end of the bill add a new title a.s
follows:
TITLE
IV-REDUCTION
OF
UNITED
STATES MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE
SEc. 401. (a) The Congress hereby finds
that the number of United States mllitary
personnel stationed in Europe can be significantly reduced without endangering the security of Western Europe, and that such areduction would have a favorable effect on this
Nation's balance-of-payments problem and
would help avoid recurring international
monetary crises involving the value of the
dollar abroad. It is therefore ~he purpose of
this section to provide for such a reduction
at the earllest practicable date.
(b) No funds appropriated by the Congress
may be u sed after December 31, 1971, for the
purpose of supporting or maintaining in
Europe any mllltary personnel of the United
States In excess of 150,000.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Montana yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that my name be
added as a cosponsor of the amendment
of the Senator from Montana, if the Senator has no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The name of the Senator from
Alaska is added as a cosponsor of the
amendment.
The Senator from Montana is recognized.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
essenti·a l purpose of this amendment is
to bring about a reduction of approximately 150,000 Armed Forces personnel

below the number presently stationed in
Europe.
In short, the amendment says it is too
late for the U.S. Government to keep
playing the role of Wilkins Micawber,
hoping that something will soon "turn
up." Something has indeed turned up: a
full-blown monetary crisis created in
large part by our failure to deal decisively with our enormous balance-ofpayments deficits. These in turn derive
mainly from our military expenditures
in Vietnam, in Europe, and elsewhere
around the world.
Mr. President, for several years now
other Senators and I who have long felt
that an excessive number of American
troops and dependents are stationed in
Europe have been strenuously cautioned
against precipitous action to reduce
those totals. Several times I have introduced resolutions making clear our belief in the need for a substantial reduction in our forces in Europe. Several times
I have held off action because I have not
wished to disrupt an allegedly delicate
situation, or to give any justification to
those who might charge that we in the
Senate have not given the most mature
and informed consideration to the problem.
The cautionary voices urging us to
wait and see have raised a variety of
reasons for inaction. Again and again
we are told there can be no question but
that the present level of American troops
in Europe in time must be reduced, and
reduced substantially. But the cautionary voices keep murmuring that now is
not the time.
We have been told that so-called offset agreements with West Germany are
going far toward closing the serious U.S.
balance-of-payments deficits incurred by
our military expenditures in Europe. Yet,
on examination we have found that much
of the offset payment has turned out to
be relatively short-term German loans
to the United States. These merely postpone our problem; they do nothing to
resolve it.
Then at the NATO ministerial meetiHJ
late last year quite a different tack was
attempted. In December we were told
that our European allies would be making a special effort to strengthen their
forces. As part of the supposed bargain
the United States would not only maintain its current levels of forces intact,
but would also contribute to the projected
increased effectiveness of the alliance's
military position. Once again, close examination reveals that the much touted
special effort over the period of the next
5 years at best will represent rather
modest progress.
Over each of the next 5 years the
Europeans together plan to spend an
additional $100 million towar·d improving their force levels and readiness,
while a similar sum would be invested
in infrastructure-that is, the facilities
located on European soil for logistical
and related purposes. In any one of the
next 5 years the combined extra European effort would amount to roughly
$200 million, or about one-ninth of the
annual U.S. balance-of-payments deficit
incurred as a result of America111 military
expenditures in Europe. This, to me, is
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not a very impressive effort when one
considers how much energy and time
went into argUing for an increase which
would encourage Americans to believe
that the corner had at last been turned.
When other arguments fail-as indeed they have--the executive branch always seems to fall back on something
which we can only call the psychological
argument. We have been lectured con-stantly over the last year on the theme
that West German efforts to promote
detente, under the heading of "ostpolitik," should not be disrupted or endangered in the slightest by any action
which would affect the balance of military forces in Europe. No one is more
interested than I in promoting a peaceful dialog between the Soviet Union and
the Western allies leading to a permanent and reliable stabilization of the
European scene. However, I have never
believed that this is a short-term proposition or process. If we are to wait for
the ft,Jl success of ostpolitik before we
can change our force levels in Europe,
then we may have to be prepared to endure a stalemate which could last for
one or two decades, or even longer, because some of the arguments against
this proposal to reduce our forces in
Europe seem to have a ling of permanency about them, and some of my colleagues feel that U.S. troops should remain in Europe ad infinitum.
The rclat~d point is also stressed that
we must take no action which could
jeopardize the political position of the
Brandt government in Germany. There
is no question about the depth of the
Chancellor's commitment to the West.
Yet, it is conjectured that some other
German lender in the future might try
to work out a unilateral deal with the
Soviet Union at the expense of the Alliance if the United States were to jar
the supposedly delicate psychological balance of the German people. Frankly,
this sort of argument is not flattering
to the German people--anymore than
comparable speculation abroad is to us
about the possible faithlessness of the
United States. Both countries should resent and reject these hypotheses. Indeed,
one could turn the argument around and
say that, since the leaders of the two
largest German political parties are unquested advocates of Western European
unity, it would be better to scale down
the U.S. presence while they are in office and can h~ndle any possible repercussions.
Mr. President, today we are seeing the
high cost of postponement of consideration of urgent problems. Time and again
Members of this body have taken the
floor to discuss our persistent and increasing balance-of-payments deficits,
to urge immediate attention to the problem, and to prophesy critical times
ahead if matters are left for the most
convenient time. The distinguished senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. f'YMINGTON) in particular, and also the distinguished senior Senator from Illinois (Mr.
PERCY ), have given us an excellent lead
in warning against just what has come to
pass; yet another international monetary
upheaval.
Last year the United States incurred

•
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a record balance-of-payments deficit of
over $10 billion on an official settlements
basis. Instead of taking the lead in calling for early and dramatic measures to
overhaul the system which could produce such disruptive deficits, the executive branch devoted most of its efforts to
figw·ing out different means of computing the balance-of-payments formula
and to assunng us that the situationalthough admittedly less than desirable-was tolerable.
Unfortunately, the financial community in WestCJn Europe has taken quite
a different \'iew of the international
monetary scene. While we have been
worrying about the fancied psychological
problems of West Germany, Europeans
have been worrying about the very real
problems of the United States. When
they looked at this country they have
seen mounting waves of unrest breaking
on a beach where the administration,
figmativcly speaking, sits like King
Canute, with arms folded, saying that
it would not be moved by the urgency of
the s!Luation. Confidence in the willingness of the United States to put its house
in order has certainly not been increased
by our display of subborn petulance. It
is too bad we have forgotten the miginal
point of the story was that of an astute
ruler showing his adoring courtiers that
his power had limits.
In fact, the European reaction
amounts to a vote of no confidence in
the international monetary policies pursued by our Government. Ironically,
taking a lead in giving expression to this
sentiment has been the country which
h as most strongly encouraged us to keep
on playing the same world role, and to
keep our forces in Europe intact. When
the chips are down it appears that a
number of our European allies are far
more interested in their domestic concerns than they are in the international
scene which they expect us to improve.
I t seems to me we have been refusing
to face up to a paradoxical European
attitude which has persisted for some
half dozen years. On the one hand, many
of our European friends constantly urge
us to maintain unchanged our commitments and ow· military forces. On the
other hand, they argue strenuously for
a reduction in our payments deficits,
which are incurred largely from the
activities which they say cannot be
altered. As far as Vietnam Is concerned,
the NATO Allies offer little advice and
less help; at least the French do us the
favor of speaking their minds clearly
and forcefully in urging withdrawal.
While a number of palliatives have
been proposed and applied, our payments position in Europe and the world
has deteriorated further. For example,
in fiscal year 1968 the amount of U.S.
defense expenditures entering the international balance of payments in Western
Europe was about $1.611 billion. In 1969
the figure fell slightly to $1.586 billion.
In fi scal year 1970, however, the figure
had risen again to more than $1.731
billion. This could hardly be termed
progress.
Now we are in a position where we must
break out of this endless circle of frustration and take clear-cut action to reduce

the payments deficits which have weakened international confidence in the dollar. Our European friends have met urgently to discuss means of coping with
the currency crisis. Their main accomplishment was to reject for their own
individual domestic reasons the compromise proposal put forward by the Commission of the European Community. In
one case, we find the finance minister
of a friendly nation avidly seeking the
devaluation of the U.S. dollar. But there
is no purpose to be served in complaining
about the alarms and excursions of the
international monetary situation. Our
Government is just as much to blame as
any other for failing to read the message on the walL
Mr. President, my amendment is designed to bring about early relief to our
pressing payments deficits abroad. It is
an amendment which is necessary and
reasonable. It will permit 150,000 American military personnel still to be stationed in Europe. Further, if these troops
that will be returned are disbanded upon
their return to the United States, it will
represent a further gain for our budget,
as well as our balance of payments. The
financial savings in that case could well
be as high as $1 Y2 billion.
It may be argued by some that this
leaves uncertain the intentions of the
United States with respect to the defense
of Western Europe and with respect to
the numbers of American forces for that
defense. But if there is one cardinal foreign policy tenet agreed upon by virtually all Americans, it is the proposition
that Western Europe, for a variety of
reasons, must not be allowed to come
under Soviet or other external domination. I will not go into all the many arguments we have made publicly over the
last few years to support our contention
that there is no compelling military argument for the exact number of forces
which we now maintain in Europe. Instead, I would like to append to this
statement an article on this subject by
a recently retired Army officer, Edward
L. King, written for the October 1970
issue of the Forum periodical, publi"hed
by the Ripon Society. Mr. King mf.kes
many of the same arguments, and I ask
unanimous consent that the article be
printed at the conclusion of my remarks
In the RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
<See exhibit lJ
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in
closing these remarks, let me stress that
I believe my amendment represents a
constructive move which will respond
not only to the demands of American
citizens for greater expenditures at home
rather than abroad but also to the demands of our European allies for urgent
American measures to get our payments
deficits under control. This does not in
any way represent a withdrawal from
Western Europe or its defense. It is quite
simply an illustration of the old French
saying that one recoils in order to jump
better.
Our forces in Europe have been in:tl.ated and musclebound, with far more
logistical than combat capability. It is
my conviction, and that of many other
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observers-including experienced mili·
tary men-that trimming away the fa1
in the form of excess supplies and head·
quarters will result in a leaner, mon
mobile, and more efficient combat force
EXHIBIT 1

[From the Ripon Futum, October 1970!
THE U.S. ARMY Il'l EUROPE
In a recent article I touched on a few o
the strategic and tactical Implications of th•
organization and purpose of U.S. Army force:
In West Germany. Let's now more close!)
examine these Implications and expand 01
the questions they raise In regard to U.S. con.
ventlonal war force levels In Europe.
ORGANIZATION

I s the U.S. Army overstaffed In w~st Ger·
many? One way to figure whether there is fat
In our European command and force structure Is to compare It to Army doctrme and
World War II experience factors.
In West Germany the Army has stationed
a total force of approximately 195,000 soldiers. Congress and the public were told that
these soldiers are all required to fight the
enemy In a conventional war. This force Is
under the overall conunand of the unified
(i.e. triservlce) U.S. European Command with
headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. This
headquarters, heavily stafled with generals
and admirals, also has an element In NATO
headquarters In Belgium. In time of peace
this unified command serves as the sen!OI
command for all U.S. armed forces In Eu·
rope, but In t1me of war It performs NATO
duties. U.S. European Command exercises it~
command supervision by passing Joint Chief!
of Staff (In Washington, D.C.) directives tc
U.S. A1 my Europe/Seventh Army headquar·
ters located 38 miles away In Heidelberg
Germany. In peacetime this hcadqum:ten
commands all Army forces In West Germany
In wartime this combined Army headquarters performs both NATO and U.S. commanC:
functions.
The next command level Is the corps headquarters. (A corps headquarters exercises tac.
tical command over military operations; it i!
not normally concerned with administrativE
support.) In West Germany there are tw<
U.S. corps headquarters. Additionally, then
Is another command element approximntelJ
equal to a corps headquarters which provide!
logistical support. These three commnnc
levels (U.S. European Command, U.S. Army,
Seventh Army, V & VII Corps headquarters)
pass directives down to the combat divisions
There are the equivalent of five divisions !1
West Germany. And once we pass the divl·
sion heaclquarters of these divisions, we wil
have finally found the Army units (tll<
brigades and battalions) that actually en.
gage In combat.
All of these command and supply headquarters require numerous generals (ovei
30 In Stuttgart alone), field grade omcen
and senior NCO's to command and stall
them. This Is In addition to the large number of troops required to man them. How
many men are engaged in these noncombatant jobs?
The best way to answer Is to consider how
many men are In the five combat divisions.
Each division at full strength contains
around 16,000 men. If our combat divisions
In Europe were at full strength (and they
seldom have been during Vietnam) there
would be a total of about 80,000 men assigned to them. We can then reasonably
speculate that the remaining 115,000 men
(of the 195,000 total force) are serving In
other than the combat divisions. In other
words roughly 115,000 men serve In administrAtive and logistic situations.
These 115,000 men are not the only ones
serving In these situations. Each division of
-about 16,000 men includes only roughly
7 ,000 soldiers who are assigned the mission
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or firing at the enemy. The r emaining 9.000
or so are assigned to administr ative command and logistic support positions within
th e di1 ision! This means that In terms of
comb[lt manpower for conventional combat
the U.S. Army in West Germany has only
:tbout 40,000 soldiers In Its combat dlvi''""" who >Lre assigned to place killing fire
c111 the enemy.

'I here is no valid mili tary reason why the
Army must organl?c itsel f su that It needs
O\'er 100,000 men to command and supply
a combat force of 80,000 soldi!'rs (Of which
less than half f1re at the enemy). For example, Army doctriue Indicates that a corps
headquarters "'nmmally"' commands two or
1nore divis ions. In Wnrld \Var II. e ach coinbat corps normally <Olll'Jlnnded an average
of four divisions. MorNJ\ t•r the U .S. Seventh
Army commanded no tess t hnn three corps
durmg World W ar II ct,nlllnt.
So why then d ocs It r!'CJHire two corps
headquarters anti a field nrmy headquarters
to command the equlvnlcul of 5 understrPngth divisions in peacetime? Because the
U.S. Army in Wt•st G ermany has grown toph eavy t !Hough (a) bureaucratic Inertia,
(b) milicary preference f0r sofl career living m Europe rat her than extended periods
of l1nng in such p laces as Fort Leonn.rd
W ood. ~ll ssonri or Fort Polk. Louisiana and
(CJ cin!J;Ui abdi cation of control over milllary P• !Icy. At least 50.000 men could be
brought home from WPst Gcrm:tny without
rNI HCillg Lhe COil\'CntlOI<al <"<>lllbat capabilIty of tile existlll~ uS Army presence !!
those forces were st rca• •lil,ed and efficiently
organized. command,.d a "' s11 pplled. Or, I!
present troop le,els lla'' t.o he mnlntau1cd,
this much n1nnpower c •t·Id be convcrt.cd
!ro1n fa t to combat mu se'•'

None of these rea,oll jnstlflcs the huge
c osts incurred to support. the cxist.in(; sys-

tem of organization nnd command . It cost
2 2 billion In fiscal hJ70, to maintain our
forcPs in West G ermany. Th1s figure does not
t ndnde the additional co·;ts i•wolved in movJng . storage

auct

slilplll"i'l

of

hot~sc hold

goods and automoblles or Lhc military personiH 1 and their dt:pelld• nts Y.bo wr·re auto-

m:ttl<'ally rotated back and f<•rth d u ring fiscal Hl70 Much or this rotatiOn IS unnecessary and is done on ly for car£'er hnpro\•e-

menh. It 1s also one of the r easons that
nearlv all Army personnel In Germany are
l'lther learning their joh or "coasti ng." waitIng to rotate back to the U.S
In any event ther!' is no acceptable justification for obvious military paunch even in
times of national budgetary surplus, much
J('ss when inflation munches on tax-dollars
and domestic programs are forced to exist on
:,nbsistence Levels.
PURPOSF'

The "rganizatlon of US. Army forces in
Enrope 1s unsatisfactory In terms of costs
and manpower utll!?atlon. Even worse are
the prohl!'ms which are created uy their
mis!,ioll.

The US. combat units-In consort with
other NATO forces-are suppnr,ed to be able
to fight a conventional war against Soviet
and satellite troops. Let us assume that our
1 0~.000 men were org:\IHZCd and commanded
efficiently. Would there be a reasonable prospect that they could do what they arc supposed to do successfully'! The answer is probably not.
Part of this answer 1s prompted by the Location and sheer numerical advantage enjoyed by their adversary: nearly 200 Soviet
and East European divisions (about 2 mllllon
men) could be thrown Into battle against 18
or 20 NATO d ivisions (about 350,000 men),
There are other d isadvantages.
ILL

POSITIONED

Relative positioning of forward units.
Within sight of many ot the autobahns leading westward through East Germany, for-

ward Soviet di visions are positioned In austere, mobile Lank and truck parks. The distance from a soldier 's tent or hut, to his tank,
truck or armored vehicle Is a matter of minutes. contrast this with the positioning or
U .S. Army forward units: the troops live in
barrack compounds often removed a halfmile or more from their tanks and vehicles.
T h e truck parks themselves are not always
immediately accessible to major roads. The
time n('eded to get our t roops on the r oad is
1nore than mtJHtles.
U.::l. dh•b1ons are st111 romlortably pos!tionf:d in the World War II occupaLLon-zone
pos itions that they took up when they arl"lved in Southern Germany In 1950 51 during
the dark days of t he Korean war. But strategic considerations would most l!kely motivate the Soviet armored forces to strike boldly across the fiat North German pl:t!ns along
the historic !nvat!on rou te to the Ruhr and
the English Channel ports. U.S. Army forces
would undoubtedly be needed to help d efend
n ot only the industrial heart of Europe but
also to protect the1r own supply lifelines
which dunng war run oaek to the channel
pons. To :.ccompllsll this, they would have
to move consiC:erable dls•ancP" to the north
to reach viable battle podit•ons. If a sudden
attack occ-urted, they woulct have to make
this movement over roads jammpu with o ther
NATO troops, 0\"er run wlcn millions of relugees (many uf whom would be t heir own
wives and child ren attempting to Ilec) and
constantly attacked by low-flying enemy aircraft. Time WOllld be critical In such a northward movement; only hours would be ava il able to attempt to Intercept and stem the
Soviet advance. Yet during the Berlin Cnsi~
of 1961 when such a movement \\as conoiderect, days not hours were estimated :u; b eIng required. And this movement would have
been conducted under peacetime conditlons!
Even asstmllng that U.S. Army comhat. clemen ts have reached improved maximums of
mobili ty and flexibility since 1961 , exhibiting
these qual!ties would require absolute tactical air superiority. I know of no military
planner who hone.;tly assumes that t he U.S.
Air F o rce will at...laiu :;nch absolute snperior-

lty (which It enjoyed over Western Europe
in 1945) until a considerable p eriod after
the opening of hostilities. And there are some
who doubt 1f it could ever attain such a degree of super!onty.
But If we assume that U.S. forces will
have absolute air super1orlty, could our 80,000 combat troops (I.e. 40 .000 who fire on the
enemy) plus approximately 260,000 NATO
combat troops, reasonably be expected to
stop the advance of Communist Bloc trc JS?
(Before answering we must remember that
H we fight a conventional war in Europe !t
w!ll be with the forces already there. The
Czechoslovakian Invasion showed that we can
no longer count on a comfortable mobilization period during which, In the best traditions or World Wars I and II, more combat
troops can be flown or shipped to Europe
from the U.S.). Mos t military professionals
privately agree that the answer Is no. However. the Army several years ago devised a
\'Cry simple solution to this problem tor
Congress and the public. They can give an
affirmative answer because they alloc~tte "tactical" (I.e. low-yield ) nuclear weapons to the
conventional forces in Europe.
Simple. Now our conventional f"Orces can
offset the Soviet and satellite manpower
advantage and delay t heir advance westward
by exploding large numbers or nuclear
devices against them !rom the very first
m oments or battle.
MOST UNCONVENTIONAL

The Army has been training for years in
Europe on the basis of such plans. Simulated
use or nuclear weapons Is written into the
scenario or most major unit training exercises. In on e NATO field training maneuver,
the Stars and Stripes n ewspaper reported
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that largt> numbers or simula ted nuclear
weapons were u ,cct . Wll,tt was not reported
was that while nuclear devices turned a
losi ng conventional t'ffo:t i?lto a winning one,
It also would have turned a conventional
war Into a nntlt'ar one And at the same
tlme it was estmJ:tled by W<·st German press
sources that about (jj r 'Jcent of West Germany would hnve !Jeen ucstroyed. In discus;Jng low- yield "'tacllc;tl"' nuclear weapons
we should remember that. I he average "tactical" lluclear weapon has the explosive f orce
of roughly one-quarter to o ne-half the
de,truct1ve power of the Hiroshima A-bomb.
Strictly m terms of physical clamage an d
Indiscriminate los~ of CIVIlian and mili tary
i!vcs. the one-sided usc of such weapons can
scarcely be called conventwnal.
And can we be sure that the Soviets would
not use at least equivalent nuclear weapons
In rPta!iatHm? One cannot beliCh' that the
S ,,·,ds w11! fight with their rifles and con\"entional artillery while we destroy whole
eli\ 1 !uns with l.ctctlcal nuclear weapons.
THE PLIGHT OF DEPL:-.!DENTS

In the e\"cnt of hostilities the necessity of
twlng nul"lcar weapons first could present
the United Stales with a grave national
clilemma . The Prcstdcnt would be faced with
1hr choice of authorizing the military comll1H1Hir>r in Europe to use nuelear weapons
( ol H I tlH rcby opj·n a ll11Clcar war ) or den y
t ht 1r t'sc and rhk the loss nr a. ltcld arrHy

nnu I he lll•es Jf n e.uly 250 000 U .S. serv!cetlH n and tlH jf farnl11es. The choice betwe<'n
inili:l.tillt""' nuC'lear escalation or failing l.)

protl'rt Ill•' lives o! American fiJ!ht!ng
W\Jlllfl n 1t. l.JP an attractive one for
l'n· -ldl·n!. Y<·l CI"Cry P resident for the
tift """ years h:>.s been fncecl with this

men
any
past
pos-

!-;I bill i.y as a r psull- of ou r etrort t.o maintn.ln

tlte fictinn of n con\·enUonal war l'apac1ty in

Lurope.
'I he ch•licr is <'•1ll1Jllil"ated by the fact that
wh

• and chilclr<•n nf U.S. servict)lncn would

be the almost Inevitable victims of our
tactiCal n uclrar weapons. If there is a warning period from hostilities being some of the
225,000 d ependents could be evacuated by
air and private automobile to •·satehavens."
If hostllit!e~ begin suddenly-and there is no
reason to bl'!icve the Soviets intend to pr.lv!de convenient advance notice of their :.ttack most officials are convinced that the
majonty of the military dependents would
have to "standfast" where they are llvlng.
These dependents would be left to fend for
themselves, as would their less fortunate
civilian countrymen who are working or
travel!ng privately in Europe and who are not
considered for assistance by U.S. armed
forces. The soldier-husbands of the m!lltary
dependents would have to fall back toward
Lhe Rhine River whlle covering their delaylllg action with "tact!c"al" unclear weapons.
In short, firing nuclear shells and rockets
on the Soviet u nits, hundreds of thousands
of West German civilians and on their own
families. (In spite of this potential disaster,
the military opposed President Eisenhower's
courageous and mllltnry sound decision In
late 1960 to stop further movement or dependents to Europe. This decision was rescinded by President Kennedy In late 1961
In response to opposl tlon from the armed
services, even though no effect! ve dependent
evacuation plan had been devised.)
We have permitted the continuation of
our conventional structure to placate the
West German government, not to fight a
conventional war. Our military leaders have
advocated retaining these forces because they
have provided Increased promotions and
pleasant duty stations. These miLitary Leaders have been comfortable In the knowledge
that they would n ot really be expected to
fight a conventional war against the formidable Red Army, because they could quickly
change such a war Into a nuclear one in
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which the U.S., until recently, held a vast
advantage. In other words political ex~<U
ency and parochial service Interests have been
allowed to supercede national best· interests:
The presence of our over 200,000-man conventional force In Europe Is fraught with
potentially dangerous risks to our national
security and Immense problems of organl::atlon and m.lsslon. It Is long pnst time for
concerned civilians and military officers to
begin the very difficult task of stre.tmltning
our force structures and more respo:~.~;b>l•t\
rationalizing their purpose In Europe. Perhaps the recent signing of the West Gcrm·u•Sovlet nonaggression pact marks the historical juncture tor our work to begin In E':u·ncsL.
EDWARD

L.

H.R. 7931. An act to amend the District of
Columbia Code with respect to the administration of small estates, and !or other purposes.

THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE
A(.r
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 6531) to amend
the Military Selective Service Act of
1967; to increase military pay; to authorize military active duty strengths for ftsc!IJ year 1972; and for other purposes.
AMENDMENT

KING .

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the abse)jPe of a quorum.
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Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I call
up my amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment of the Senator from Montana \vill be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
At the end of the bill add a new title as
follows:
TITLE
IV- REDUCTION
OF
UNITED
STATES MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE

SEC. 401. (a) The Congress hereby finds
that the number of Un ited States military
personnel stationed In Europe can be significantly reduced without endangering t he
security of Western Europe, and that such a
reduction would have n. favorable effect on
this Nation's balance or p.\ymeuts problem
and would help avoid recurring International
monetary crises Involving the value of the
dollar abroad. It is therefore the purpose of
this secclon to provide for s uch a reduction
at the earliest practicable date.
(b) No funds appropriated by the Congress may be used after December 31, 1971,
for the purpose of supporting or maintaining
In Europe any military personnel of the
United States In excess of 150,000.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we
have order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I requested the prepartion last week of a
memorandum on this overall question of
troops in Europe by Mr. Edward L. King.
Mr. King has had extensive opportunity to study these questions both as a
staff planner within the military and as
a sensible and concerned citizen since
his retirement. He brings to bear a clearness of presentation of the arguments
and a crispness of focus and recommendation that should benefit the entire
Senate.
The memorandum is in every respect
outstanding. I ask unanimous consent
that this memorandum of Mr. King be
printed at this point in the RECORD, so
as, in effect to follow my previous remarks.
There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
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RETENTION OF U .S. FORCE LEVELS IN
WESTERN EUROPE
OVERALL PROBLEM

Can the number o! U .S. Armed Forces
personnel stationed In Europe be substantially reduced without scrloulsy weakening
the deterrent capability of the NATO military structure ?
SOME FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

a. Over 300,000 U .S. military personnel
(Including 20,000 In the 6th Fleet) are stationed In Western Europe.
1. Of thts number 128 are general/ flag offleers-or one general flag officer !or every
2,343 men.
·
2. About 250,000 o! these troops are assigned to the tri-servlce U.S. guropean Command (USEUCOM). The De~artment o! Defense has Indicated that hal! of these assigned forces are combat personnel and the
rest are support. Over 170,000 of the EUCOM
total are U.S. Army troops.
3. Major USEUCOM combat elements are
4 \13 Army division d eployed in West Germany. These divisio ns are not o.t full
strength. According to Army Tables or Organization and Equipment the o.ggrego.te
full strength o! each of these d 1v1slons would
be around 16.300 men. It costs approximately
$185 million to mamtain one army dlvtsion
on o\·erscas r eacettme active duty for a year.
4. There are about 113,500 Army and Air
Force personnel stationed In the Continental U.S. committed to NATO. In Europe
about 2,000 American personnel are engaged
In maintaining and bervlcing prestocked
equipment to be used by these committed
forces.
b. There are now approximately 7,000 U.S.
nuclear warheads stored In Europe.
c. During fiscal yenr 1971 It cost approximately $14 billion !or the support or U.S.
general purpose forces' In Europe and the
forces in the U.S. committed to NATO.
1. This total figure Includes opeartlng
costs and estimated annual investment In
equipment and military construction.
2. Annual operating cost to maintain U.S.
forces In western Europe is approximately
$2.9 billion.
d. U .S. defense expenditures entering the
International balance o! payments In NATO
countries (Including Canada) in fiscal year
1970 are estimated at approximately $2 billion, with about $1.1 billion being spent In
the Federal Republic of Germany.
1. For every soldier removed from Germany,
an approximate saving o! $1,650 In Individual exepndltures on the European economy
can he realized.
2. The withdrawal and deactivation o! 2
mechanized divisions now stationed In Europe would result In annual savings o! about
$1 billion.
e. The U.S. forces In Europe have over 79
real property locations In seven countries,
that represent a total U.S. Investment In excess of $204.5 million.
f. Payment o! land taxes In Great Britain
and Western Germany amounts to $2.9 million annually.
g. Approximately hal! o! the European
Command's transportation needs must be accomplished by European commercial sources
at a cost of $29 million In 1969.
h. Expenditures !or employment o! European local nationals by U.S. forces amounted
to $265 mllllon from appropriated fundS in
calendar year 1969.
1. Until March 1971, U.S. citizens were In
most cases excluded !rom filling local hire
vacancies.
1. Total operating costs o! U .S. Army, Navy
and Air Force European Commands In :ftscal
year 1970 were approximately ta7.SS mllllon.
During the same year U .B. operating coats
o! NATO headquarters were •10,6~3,033.00.
1. These operating costa represent only a
fraction o! the tot1111 cost o! each command.

For example, the headquarters operating cost
for U.S. Army Europe was only 2.30 per cent
of the totn.l fund It was provided o! $1,761,000,000.00.
2. In addition to these operating costs the
9 U.S. Army Command headquarters, for example, contained 26 generals, 1,286 other
officers and 1,908 enlisted men all drawing
higher salaries while performing command
or staff jobs.
j. While the percentage o! U.S. GNP going
to defense has increased over the past 20
years, that of ou r NATO allies has declined.
k. Major NATO ground forces presently
available In the center region of Europe consist of 22 division equivalents.
1. This total Includes the 4\1:, U.S. divisions
but does not Include two French divisions
not committed to NATO but present In West
Germany.
2. The Lisbon Conference o! 1950 called
tor a. total NATO force of 90 divisions.
3. Few. I! any. of the 22 NATO di visions are
at full combat strength In men or equipmen t.
For example, there are shortagPs of trained
NCO's and junior officers In some of the West
German divisions.
1. Soviet forces In E'lst Germany are estlm"ted by the Defense Departmen t to number
over 300,000 troops deployed In excess of 20
armored and motorized di visions. Additional
Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia, Poland
and Hungary bring the total Soviet forces
outside the Soviet borders to over 500,000
men.
1. Estimates by SHAPE Indicate that the
Warsaw Pact forces have twice as many divisions In the center region as NATO.
2. Warsaw Pact forces have been estimated
to be able to mobilize more than 175 divisions.
3. The SHAPE Commander has stated that
when "fully mobilized" Warsaw Pact tank
forces outnumber NATO's by 3 'to 1.
4. The EUCOM Commander has stated that
the Soviets "have additional forces In Russia which can move forward rapidly" to reInforce the forces deployed In Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germa ny.
m. Article 5 or the North Atlantic Treaty
provides that each member may "take such
action as It deems necessary" and It can act
Individually and in concert with other parties
In the event o! an armed attack on a member state. The parties do not commit themselves necessarily to take mil1tary action to
repel any attack.
n. Article 11 of the NATO Treaty stipulates
that the provisions of the Treaty shall be
carried out "In accordance with their respective constitutional processes."
o. Article 3 o! the Treaty stlpulatee that
members agree to main and develop their
Individual and collective capacity to resist
attack. But no specific means are expressed
for meeting thts obligation.
Discussion pro and con of substantially
reducing U.S. troop levels ln Europe

Countless arguments have been advanced
why It Is not feasible or possible, to reduce
present U .S. troop levels In Europe. Generally these arguments follow fixed patterns
and are based on hypothetical assumptions
and predictions. A synthesis o! these con
arguments can be grouped as follows:
1. The U.S. Depe.rtmenta o! State and Defense concept that the Soviets might risk a
military move In Europe l! they believed
American strategic nuclear power hll!d been
checked and NATO conventional forces were
seriously weakened.
2. A rigid concomitant belief by these two
U.S. Departments In the doctrine of flexible
response, which poses present U.S. conventional troop levels as a necessity to counter
any conventional war attack by Warsaw Pact
troops without an early resort to nuclear
weapon&
&. As p&rt of this argument the case 1s
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also made that NATO conventional forces
must be maintained at current levels so they
can effectively meet any low level Soviet or
Warsaw Pact military "probe" of the NATO
area without having to go to nuclear war to
counter such a probing action.
b. Also cited as support for this argument
are the agreed NATO COl . tngencles o! ( 1)
limited unexpected conflicts which could give
rise to larger hostilities, (2) crises preceded
by a period of political tension which could
occur after a period o! several weeks or
months. It Is advanced that these contingencies preclude a thin forward defense because such a defense would Invite "probes",
while a balanced posture makes them less
likely and In effect deters all such options.
3. The belle! that any substantial withdrawals would set In motion a chain of
causation that would ultimately unravel the
the entire NATO alliance.
4. Concern t.ha.t the psychological shock
on our European allies (particularly the
West German) of a substantial reduction of
U.S. troops would be devastating to the1r
morale and would Inevitably lead to eventual
Soviet dominance In Western Europe. This
r esult Is predicated on the prem ise that any
substantial withdrawal of Amencan forces
would be the start of reduced European force
levels and cause the Europeans to lose confidence In the significance of their own
armed forces ability to d eter Soviet attack.
This would then cause them to seek n burned
accommodation with the Svolet Union.
a.. As an adjunct to this argument it is
also postulated that a substantial U.S. force
reduction would (In the minds of the Europeans) signal a return to U.S. isolationism
and Indicate that the U.S . would not defend
Western Europe militarily. This Is , iewed ns
the rationale for a concurrent rise or Sov1ct
lnfiuence and eventual d omination of Western Europe.
b. Another variation of this argument Is
the West Germany position that substantial
U .S. troop cuts would demoraltze Western
European public opinion and convert the
current moOd of detente with the Soviets
Into one o! appeasement.
5. The conviction that unilateral force
reductions would weaken our hand In the
current hope o! negotiating with the Warsaw
Pact countries for mutual balanced troop
reductions.
6. Belle! that dollar savings Inherent In a
substantial troop reduction In Europe would
be insignificant In relation to the risk to our
national security.
7. State and Defense contention that forces
approaching current levels must remo.ln In
Europe since forces hastily returned during
a crtsls are not as effective as those stationed
In Europe.
a. A buffer to this argument Is made by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff a.nd the SHAPE
Commander General Goodpaster, who argue
that It Is not feasible to reduce even the
logistics "tall" of the U.S. forces in Europe.
They consider that such support troops are
vital for the time when additional u.s.
troops are flown to Europe during a crisis.
They further contend that troops should not
be reduced, but I! cuts must be made, they
should be made In combat forces rather than
support forces.
8. Department or State belle! that an overrld!Ilf!' political argument against substantial
reductions artsea out or the transitional nature of the early 1970's In Europe and that
troop cuts should not be made during this
transitional periOd !or fear of IntrOducing a
d estabilizing factor, which would seriously
limit our capacity to achieve effectively an
optimum future relationship with Western
Europe. ·
In considering the counterweight pro B.lguments for ma.klng a substantial troop reduction, It Is necessary to measure the above con.
a.rguments against a criteria of what these
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U.S. troops actually do In a oombat sense to
defend the national security. And within
that oontext to critically analyze the basic
validity of the counter arguments advanced.
The article attached as Appendix 1 covers
some of the specific problems that relate to
our conventional troop deployments In Europe and Is an overview of what our troops
actually do. Brlefiy stated, our 4Y, diviSions
deployed In West Germany are a delaying
f orce which Is badly positioned and Insufficient to accompllsh its primary mission of
retarding Soviet ground advance Into Western Europe . Due to its inferiority in numbers
of actual combat soldiers, poor tactical organization and pos1t1oning, It must basically
rely on tactical nuclear weapons for any
h ope of successfully accomplishing Its mission, and In fact for Its own salvation In the
event of a determln~d attack by the Red
Army.
Anyone considering the argument against
substantial troop reductions should do so
against the background of the above-mentioned negative facets of our European conventional troop deployments. From that
point 1t then becomes possible to more perceptlvely answer the arguments. Briefly,
those answers can be stated as follows:

solely for the purpose o:f an expansionistic
military grab o:f Western Europe. This files
in the face of all logic and most past European history.
Analysis of Con Argument 2, that the credibility of the doctrine at ftexibile response
depends on present troop levels

This Is a specious argument that has been
used long beyond the time it was true. It Is
a military justification for maintalning large
numbers of Anny troops (with the accompanying high-rank justifying headquarters
and support commands and career-rewarding
overseas base II vlng) stationed lndeflni tely
In Central Europe . It is a. specious argument
because present troop levels do not In fact
offer a valid fiexible response to a determined Soviet conventional attack at any
level of force or purpose. But rather are too
weak to effectively react (the Berlin Crisis
of 1961 Is an excellent example of this weakness when the strongest conventional reaction we dared make to the challenge of the
Berlin Wall and closing of the Autobahn to
Berlin, was to dispatch one less-thanbrigade-strength force to Berlin and this
force wns then lgnomillously forced to dismount from its vehicles Inside East Germ ~ ny and be counted by Soviet officers beAnalysis of Con Argument 1, that Soviets fore being permitted to pass to Berlln). At
the same time this force Is too large to permight attack after checkmating American
mit effective fiexlblllty In the manner of U.S.
strategic nuclear power and in the event
response
to any level of Soviet mill tary acof a weakening of our present conventional
tion.
forces
For example, under the provisions of ArtiThe two substantive points made do not
:factually fit with the actual conditions they cles 5 and 11 of the NATO Treaty all members
postulate. For example, the so-called check- mlgh t not choose to react mill tarily to all
Ing of American strategic nuclear power levels of Soviet m1lltary action. Their conthrough nuclear weapons parity (and It stitutional processes might inhibit or restrict
should be remembered that latest lntellt- a mllltary response. After the VIetnam exgence reports credit the U.S. with 4,000 nu- perience public opinion in the U.S. could In
clear warheads to the Soviet's 1800) or arms the near future conceivably not be favorable
limitation, does not remove the ultimate to an automatic m1lltary reaction to all levels
threat of nuclear war and mutual destruc- of Soviet action in Western Europe. However,
tion at the option of either of the super- with present force levels stationed In Eurppe,
powers. It Is reasonable to assume that the the U.S. has no option but to become Involved
Soviets are quite aware that any mllttary In a conventional mil1tary response. Such a
move Into Western Europe would be looked conventional response is in fact too weak to
upon by us as a threat to our vital Interests. have much chance of success even with all
They would make such a move only after NATO allies participating and foredoomed to
carefully calculating the nuclear balance and . early failure It some would choor...e not to
probable weapons, not the current conven- Initially engage In a mil1tary response.
But this U.S. force Is too large (over 170,000
tional troop levels which they already know
they can handily defeat In conventional men and 149,000 dependents with the 7th
battle. It Is (and will continue to be) the Army alone) to permit the President any deweight of American nuclear response and gree of fiexib1llty, or the U.S. constitutional
the possibility of mutual national destruc- processes time to function effectively In retion that would ensue, that restrains any gard to a response to almost any form of real
Soviet predilection toward military adven- or imagined Tonkin Gulf-type attack In
Western Europe. The protection of the ltv"•
tures In Europe.
It is this fear far more than It Is the of a field army of U.S. fighting men and their
numbers of men. planes, tanks and guns fa.r,nil1es, would take precedence over all other
that they would face In making such a move. legitimate questions o:f U.S. national best inIn a historical context 1t should be remem- terests at the time. Because of their numbers
bered that the Red Army drove several mil- and p06ltlonlng the U.S. forces would have to
lion of the Nazi Whermachts' finest combat be engaged in immediate fighting. Yet beveterans back Into Western Europe In 1945, cause of the Insufficiency of these same numand In the process lost millions of their own bers to fight effectively In conventional batpopulation. It Is Inconceivable to my mind tle, there would be the urgent need to permit
to imagine that this same people and Army, them to fire the Atomic Demolition Muniin the foreseeable future, will this soon after tions (ADM) mines during the first hours of
those staggering numbers Of dead, be ln- any level of conflict. And there would be the
cllned to launch an aggressive war into West- :follow-on need for them to quickly resort to
ern Europe and accept the countless deaths further tactical nuclear weapon fires to prothat a nuclear (or conventional) war would tect themselves from being pocketed In the
surely bring. Conversely, it is equally un- Southern German sallent. The probability of
llkely that a people who have sustained and early use of nuclear wapons Is not supposirecovered from such previous monumental tion. This use is written into the 7th Army
losses In war would long be deterred from a battle plans.
In an appearance before the Senate Commilitary action by the prospect or fighting
2 or 4 Y,, or 20 U.S. divisions In conventional mittee on Foreign Relations, General Goodbattle; If that was the only alternative to a paster alluded to this when he stated: "If
direct threat to the continued existence o:f a.n enemy were to come at us with all the
forces that the Warsaw Pact could generate
Mother Russia.
We should remember the Russians tradi- and were to sustain and press his attack retionally are a brave, but not :foolhardy, gardless of the losses that he took, after a
people. I fail to see the rationality In an argu- short pericd of. time (ltallcs supplied) it
ment that a bureaucratic Soviet government would be probable that at least in some
and its anned forces would, or oould, call on areas we would have to resort to nuclear
their people to again accept mlllions of dead weapons in order to hold." At another point
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when asked what the NATO situation would
be 45 days after the outbreak o! hostilities In
Europe with both sides using only conven-'
tlop.al forces, General Goodprt.Ster replled, "I
belleve that thre Is a probability that lt.
would be necessary to resort to the support
of tactical nuclear weapo. '"General Lyman
Lemnitzer, SHAPE Commander from 1962
to 1969, has stated, "One of the greatest
problems that would confront NATO today
would be a large conventional attack. Then
we would be !aced with a decision to use nuclear weapons or be defeated."
These statements and 7th Army training
exercises In which simulated tactical nuclear weapons are routinely used, would
seem to discredit the concept that present
force levels guarantee fiexlblllty and preclude the early resort to nuclear weapons
The same war plans and exercises also minimize the possiblllty of Umlted Soviet probes
in favor of preparation for a massive attack
from Czechoslovakia and through the Fulda
and Hof "gaps". This mllltary planning Is
generally predicated on the assumption that
an attack will follow a period o:f increasing
tensions which wU! permit the evacuation of
dependents, repositioning of 7th Army forces
and reinforcement :from the United States.
This warning time allows a thickening of
what Is actually a presently "thin" forward
defense being planned for a very shallow
theater .of operations with France no longer
militarily In NATO. From a factual military
standpoint present troop levels do not conclusively deter the possib1llty of rather unlikely probes, nor give much probability of
successfully conventional defense against
major attack. It would require a much larger
commitment of troops than either the U.S.
or our NATO all1es can afford to do this.
Analysis of Con Argument 3, that any substantial withdrawal of U.S. forces would
set in motion an unraveling of the NATO
alliance

ThiS argument is purely hypothetical. No
substantial evidence has been advanced to
support this thesiS, nor IS there any historical
precedent which would Indicate that such
an unraveling o:f the alliance would be the
inevitable result o:f a phasedown of U.S. troop
levels to a force o:f, say, 100,000 men. Within
the alliance there have been past reductions of U.S. and British force levels, as well
as the complete withdrawal o:f 10 French
divisions from the NATO m111tary command.
This did not set in motion a chain of causation that has led toward collapse of the alliance. On the contrary, it has caused redoubled effort by the remaining members
to attempt to Improve the ca.pab111ty of the
alliance. There is no substantive evidence
to Indicate that :further reduction of U.S.
troop levels could not be used to stimulate
Increased European initiative and Interest
In strengthening the Atlantic Alliance.
Analysis of Con Argument 4, concerning the
psychological shock that substantial troop
reduction would have on our European
allies and which would result in eventual
Sovtet dominance over Europe

The substance of this argument has been
stated by Martin J. Hlllenbrand, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs,
"The psychological shock on our European
allies of an American withdrawal from Europe would be devastating. The glacial pressures of Soviet power upon a Western Europe
that knows Itself to be militarily weak and
politically divided would In due course, Insure effective Soviet dominance." Furthermore, Mr. Hlllenbrand Indicated that it
"would be beyond the capacity o:f diplomacy"
to convince the Europeans that any substantial withdrawal did not mark the end of
the effective American commitment to defend Western Europe even i:f 100,000 or more
U .S. troops remained In Europe.
The :foundation o:f this view is more emo-
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tiona! conjecture designed to justify a continuation of the status quo In Europe, than
an accurate assessment of what Is Jlkely to
happen If U.S. military force levels are
reduced. There would of course be some Initial adverse reaction on the part of our
European allles to a substantial troop cut.
But I can not believe It would be of anywhere near devastating proportions to overall European morale and will to defend themselves (and I have lived In Europe 9 of the
past 17 years and have friends there).
I fall to find the logic In the r easoning
that even an adverse psychological reaction
to a cut In the number of U.S. troops statoned In Europe could cause citizens of Great
Britain or West Germany to lose confidence
In their own national armed forces' abllity
to defend them. If the level of confidence Is
truly that low, then NATO Is In fact a thin
reed. I do not believe this Is the case. Nor
do I believe that a reduction to a force of
over 100,000 U.S. troops In Europe would In
the mind of the average European signal
a return by the U.S. to pre-World War II
Isolationism. The European Is quite aware
that our own people are suffering devastating
psychological shocks In the cities across
America. He Is aware of unemployment, financial problems and our war-weariness.
Though he may regret the occurrence of substantial troop reductions, he Is far more
likely In the long run to understand the reasons that require that they be made, than
be Is to hysterically lose heart and turn to
an accommodation with the Russians. We
fall to understand the worldlines and maturity of the European people when we give
serious credence to such unreasoned behavior
on their part.
In consideration of a remaining force of
over 100,000 U.S. soldiers In Europe, our continued nuclear guarantees and the massive
·capital Investment and control exercised by
U .S. firms doing business In Western Europe;
It Is highly unrealistic to conclude that a
reduction of two divisions from West Germany will automatically trigger a rise of
Soviet Influence throughout Western Europe.
H numbers of divisions were the criteria for
a position of dominating Influence In Western Europe, the Soviets would have long held
such a position. It should be recognized
that a substantial withdrawal of American
business enterprise would do more to promote the Impact of a Soviet domination tn
Western Europe than the removal of a few
clivlslons.
The first steps toward a European
(chiefly west German) detente with Russia
have been made. France has previously made
.ln attempt to achieve some form of detente
1 with the Soviet Union. Neither of these
1 ~teps have produced any notice ble demoraltzatlon of the Western European people.
French efforts under DeGaulle at wooing
Russia did not create any widespread feelIng of appeasement among the West Gerlnans for example. The avowed purpose of
current West German efforts at detente are
directed toward the easing of tensions In
Central Europe. It is equally difficult to accept that a reduction of even half of the
current U.S. force levels In Europe would cr~
ate In European minds such and attitude of
demoralization that they would turn from
detente to appeasement. This reasoning Ignores the French withdrawal from NATO
and subsequent efforts at detente with Russ_la that did not produce an appeasement
attitude. It also falls to give full consideration to the weight of the continued American presence and nuclear guarantees that
~>till would exist after a troop reduction.
·! nalysis of Gem Argument 5 that unilateral

force reductions would weaken the u.s.
negotiating position with the Soviets for
mutual balanced troop reductions

For years Western statesmen have defined
1· e Soviet goals In Central Europe as a

continuation o! ,a divided Germany, a removal of all American troops from Europe
and the dismemberment of NATO. Assum1~ that this de!1nltlon 1s accurate, It would
seem that U.S. force levels would not be a
decisive factor In negotiating mutual troop
reductions. Soviet overall goals would appear to dictate that It would be equally as
Important to remove a remaining 100,000plus U.S. troops as to remove 300,000 troops.
Any level of U.S. force maintained In Central
Europe would be a bargaining agent toward
mutual reductions.
No one has suggested that these mutual
reductions must be on a man-for-man or
dlvlslon-for-dlvlslon basts. Obviously, such
reductions would favor the Soviets who have
a preponderant strength to begin with. Any
mutual reductions would have to be worked
out on a relative basts and this could be
arranged as well with 160,000 U.S. troops as
with 300,000 troops. The key to the Issue Is
the Warsaw Pact slncerHy In desiring mutual
reductions. To date, they have Insisted that
any discussions concerning mutual balanced
force reductions must be within the framework of a European security conferencesomething our Secretary of State and the
NATO foreign ministers oppose In principle.
I t Is unlikely that such an Impasse of opinion
between East and West Is going to be resolved In the foreseeable future an"d this In
fact Implies that the U.S. must continue
present force levels for an Indefinite period
until the question of a European security
conference can be settled. Such a position Is
tantamount to saying that U.S. force levels
In Europe wlll remain the same for an Indeterminate number of years-possibly another
de<:ade.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk speaking tn
relation -to the U.S. troop reductions In
Europe In 1967 stated that he favored those
reductions "not only because they were steps
of economy, but also because they constituted a tension-lessening signal to the Soviet Union." The withdrawals that Secretary
Rusk referred to represented a reduction of
U.S. forces below their pre-1961 Berlin Crisis
strength, and came at a time when world
tensions were steadily Increasing as the war
In Vietnam escalated In Intensity. Yet these
reductions did not produce any collapse of
European morale, nor did they set In motion
any chain of causation that caused the Soviets to exploit our position In Berlin that
was weakened by the heavy demands of the
VIetnam buildup ..The further thinning out
of our manpower and equipment from our
European based troops for use In Vietnam
1968 and 1969 did not result In any Soviet
moves to take advantage of our weakened
forces. In fact, It was during this period that
continued Soviet troop transfers from Europe
to the Siberian front with China occurred.
No public evidence available to date Indicates that our force levels In Europe necessarily play a decisive role In the possibility
of gaining mutual balanced force reductions.
On this question It appears that the Intent
and purposes of both the NATO and Warsaw
Pact alliances Is far more Important to a successful outcome than the tactical question
of the precise number of troops Involved.
Analysts of Con Argument 6, which stresses
that the actual dollar savings involved tn
a substantial U.S. troop reduction would
be insignificant in relation to the grave
r-isk to our national security

The fiscal yee.r cost of maintaining U.S.
forces In Europe and those In the U.S. committed to Europe, is put at $14 bllllon. U.S.
annual balance-of-payment costs In NATO
countries are estlmlllted at $1.7 bUllon. At
present offset agreements with West Germany balance out only some of these costs.
If U.S. force levels were cut In half, It would
be possible to realize savings In the range
of $500 mllllon or more under current conditions. These savings could eventually be
substantially much more than that amount,
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If we take Into acoount the future Increased
pay scales envisioned for our armed forces
and the growl~ Inflation In Europe.
Opponents to troop cuts e;ite the fact
that unleoo the troops brought back are
demoblllzed they stlll must be paid the.
same amounts. The dlvlslr'lS returned could
be deactivated. But even If they are not,
the money they spend would go Into the
pockets of American rather than European
businessmen. It would thus directly return
to the American economy. Another argument
put forward Is that 1f U.S. force levels were
cut, West Germany would no longer pay offset costs on the same magnitude as today.
Of course the balance-of-payment costs
would not continue on the magnitude that
the are today either, If two Aivlslons (with
all their sustaining elements) were ret urned
from Europe.
Since there Is no clear argument on how
the removal of two U.S. divisions from Western Europe presents a grave threat to U.S.
n.a.t lonal se<:urlty, It Is difficult to equate accurately this statement to the very rea!
possibility of effecting annual savings In U.S.
balance-of-payment costs In excess of $500
million.
Analysis of Con Argument 7, that force levels
must remain the same because forces hastily returned during a crisis arc not as effective as those pet·manently stationed in
Europe

This argument bas llttle hlstorl<;al ml!ltary substance In relation to the U.S. armed
forces. In two world wars U.S. forces have traditionally fought well In Europe over battle
terrain they had never seen before. Besides.
battlefields change from day-to-day as do the
personnel '1ghtlng the battle. Therefore famIliarity with Initial battle terrain has little
actual effect a'fter the first day or two of
combat. I! they are well trained, newly arrived forces would be every bit as effective as
those permanently stationed In Europe.
In a letter of April 27, 1970, to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the
Secretary of State In commenting on Senate
Resolution 292, stated, "Additional redeployments would bring such disadvantages as the
loss of constant liaison with forces on our
flanks, danger of massive confusion In a crisis
situation and Increased risks to our forces as
they moved forward Into position. Moreover.
any division we redeployed to the US. could
only be returned to Europe quickly If we
preposition Its equipment and rely on airlift 'for return of the forces . Since we already
preposition equipment for some of our U.S.
based divisions, any additional reliance on redeployment with preposltlonlng would strain
not only our transport capablllty but also
reception !acllltles In Europe."
Most of these reasons are straw men. Due
to the high personnel turnover In Europe tbe
Infantry combat units that I commanded
there seldom were half the men In them
who were even faintly fll.m1llar wtth the terrain over which our er11.ergency mission called
for us to fight. Liaison with forces on the
flanks of the U .S. forces In Europe Is the responsibility of headquarters higher than division level. The Army has bad twenty years
to plan for the forward movement of U.S.
forces In Western Europe In time o f crisis.
If there exists today a real posslblllty of
"massive confusion" and "Increased risks to
our forces" then two decades of Army Commanders and staff planners have failed to do
their job. If such a situation truly exis ts then
all U.S. divisions should probably be withdrawn from West Germany. They ca n't hope
to fight and stay there IT they cannot be
efficiently reinforced In the forward battle
areas.
The problem of preposlttonlng dt v.slo n
equipment and the subsequent requirement
for a second costly set In the U.S. Is an old
dodge. There are many ways this seemingly
lnsurmouhtable problem could be overcom e .
And none would be as costly In balance of
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payments as keeping the divisions In Europe.
One Is to dual-base our statesl&e diVisions
that are committed to Europe, with U.S. National Guard or R-eserve divisions and have
each or these divisions use the same set o!
heavy division equipment In the U.S.
It the division returned to Europe this
heavy equipment could be left In the U.S. for
use by the Guard or Reserve division when It
was mobilized. Or, some of It could: be alrll.!ted with the division to Europe. Kt present
enough equipment tor approximately two
divisions Is preposltloned In Europe. The
equipment tor two more divisions could be
maintained afloat In East Coast ports and
could arrive In Europe within 9 to 15 days.
The U.S. airlift capacity would require at
least that long to transport 4 divisions to Eu. rope. In any event It Is not feasible to believe that ln time of crisis In Europe, the
nation that can put men on the moon cannot expeditiously move two divisions and
their equipment to Europe In less than two
weeks.
It also makes little sense to me to continue to maintain the excessive logistics
"tall" In position to service additional divisions that will theoretically be flown to Europe during a crisis, If those divisions face
the danger of "massive confusion" and "Increased risks" during forward movement to
battle. Yet despite these evident dangers and
risks, the Joint Chiefs and the SHAPE Commander advocate wltbdrawing the combat
diVisions rather than the logistics support
forces. Their concem points up the !act that
under today's Army tactical organization
• there must be a huge logistics base befOTe the
U.S. Army can commence to fight. This Is an
organizational concept which must be
changed I! the Army Is going to ever again
fight austerely and etrectlvely anywhere In
the world.
Analysis of Con Argument 8, concerning the
transitional nature oj the early 1970' s in
Europe and the contention that troop cu.ts
would inject a destabilizing factor

Europe has been in transition at least
since 1870 and wlll no doubt continue so for
many years to come. There have been numerous dlstabUizlng factors Injected Into the
NATO scene over the past ten years. The
rejection o! British entry into the Common
Market and French withdrawal from NATO,
could be cited as two more recent examples.
Yet none of these serious factors have produced a collapse o! the alliance on the scale
that Is being so direly predicted 1f the U.S.
withdraws two Army divisions and their
sustaining troops from Europe.
To accept the transitional argument Is to
accept that It will be necessary to continue
Indefinitely to provide a level of conventional defense !or our NATO all!es that they
have clearly demonstrated they are unwillIng to provide !or themselves. This convenilonal defense Is o! qucst.Ionable value and
comes at excessive cost to the citizens ot the
United States. The United States Is also In
a period o! transition. And this translstlonal
period In our country demands that we reduce our overseas balance or payments In
order that these millions may be available
to assist us through our period of changing
priorities. As an American the well-being
of our country seems to me a far more overriding argument than a theoretical risk to
our national security postulated by Europeans who do not want to divert their money
and manpower to defend themselves. These
Europeans are supported by our own State
and Defense people who !or many bureaucratic reasons desire to maintain the Cold
War status quo In Europe Indefinitely.
It Is true that the prosperity or the U.S.
and western Europe hlis advanced markedly
during the past years of NATO. But the time
has now come when economic good sense
dictates that U.S. defense forces In Europe
must be reduced in our own best Interest.

To further delay these reductions In the
hope of achieving what the Secretary o!
State has called on "optimum future relationship" Is to overlook our past elforts
of twenty years while risking the sacrifice
of our own national future In the bargain.
GENERAL COMMENTS AND CONCLUSION

Despite arguments to the contrary, U.S.
troop levela In Europe should be reduced
by the equivalent o! two divisions and their
su.sta.inlng troops (roughly 100,000 men).
Additionally, at least another 50,000 men
should be withdrawn from the layers of U.S.
Command headquarters (such as EUCOM,
USAREUR, USAFE and USNAVEUR) and
non-USEUCOM forces such as the Military Assistance Groups. The number o! tactical nuclear weapons stored in Europe should
be reduc-ed. Pa.rtlcular attentlon should be
given to the political and military consequencea of the possible emplacement and
use · of Atomic Demolition Mines (ADM)
during an emergency. U.S. Southern European Task Force (SETAF) in Verona, Italy,
and Its supporting logistics complex at Camp
Darby, IJvorno, Italy, should be withdrawn.
If needed, the limited r&nge nuclear fire
support that th.1.s 'IIask Force now provides
to th-e Italla.n army could be teturned in time
of emergency. The Berlin Brigade should be
reduced by one Infantry battalion. Under
EUCOM war planning these forces are 'written olf in time of war. They are only symbolic and two battalions can do this as well
as three. The loth Special Forces and Fifth
Psychological Operation Battalion should
also be withdrawn.)
War plans of the U.S. 7th Army should
be reviewed to establish whether or not this
force does have a slgnlftca.nt capacity to provide a flexible respom;e to Soviet attack,
without early use of SOille form of tactical
nuclear weapons. For example, In 1962 the
7th Army considered It necessary to make
early use of ADM'a and low-yield (2.5-10
KT) nuclear weapons In making a defense
of Europe east of the Rhine River. This was
at a time when there were I!IPProxlmately
400,000 troops lnclu~ 5 dlvlalons 1n Europe, and the available NATO theater of
operations and supply llnes extended back
acro.ss the width and depth of France.
Since that time the force has been reduced to 300,000 troops including 4¥., divisions. The possible theater of operations has
been reduced to the narrow width of West
Germany and tbe Benelux countries and the
British Army of ihe-Rhine has been reduced.
U.S. supply llne 1n peacettme runs down
from Bremerhaven, Germany, and in WI\ • •
time must be shifted !rom the vulnerable
route to the Bene!= Channel ports, which
still are only a day O£ so travel away from
Russian armor in East Germany. To compensate !or the loss o! the depots In France,
huge stocks (60 days level) of supplies have
been moved forward to Kalserslautern, Germany, where they are extremely vulnerable to destruction !rom a Soviet pre-emptive
air strike or early capture by advancing
Soviet armor. Our European allies who plan
on 90 day mob111zatlon periods stockpile !or
30 day levels while we plan on rushing
troops to Europe In 30 days. Equally vulnerable to pre-emptive air strike or capture
by Soviet armor are the U.S. 17th Air Force
fighter squadrons clustered In unprotected
sites In the Bltburg-Rurnsteln-SpangdohlemPrum complex In West Germany. Furthermore, In case o! sudden attack, there are
the unsolved problems o! how to evacuate
the 227,000 military dependents. And the
as ye~ unanswered problem of how we will
land the airborne redeveloped forces flown
In during a crisis, 1f the Soviets knock out
the available air landing sites by air or rocket
fire, capture them by ground attack or dominate the air over them.
AU o! these ser!oU!I military problems have
long existed In our European defense planning. Since they could not be solved they
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have often been Ignored or glossed-over. Yet
In 1962 when conditions and options were
far more favorable for flexible response t han
today, It was felt that an early use of tactical
nuclear weapons wOUld be vital to any successful defense. Now with less options, the
same•military problems, r 1 us other even more
grave, with less troops, and a smaller theater
of operations In which to swap space for
time, the American public Is being told that
our conventional forces will put up an even
longer conventional defense without resorting to tactical nuclear weapons. This Is the
rhetoric used to justify keeping our military
and State Department empire In position in
Europe. But It Is not a factual a.sseo,sment of
the probable situation.
In the event of sudden Soviet attack, the
U.S. 7th Army mu.st" resort to early ,~!thin
the first 24 to 90 hours of comrnenc:lng battle
to meet a sudden attack) first use or tactical
nuclear weapons I! it hopes to prevent being
outflanked and pocketed against the Alps and
ann1111la ted.
In my opinion one U.S. Army Corps containing an armored and mechanized Infantry division reinforced with one armored
cavalry regiment positioned along the line
Bremen-Hannover-Kassel and supported by
supply lines running back to Rotterdam or
Antwerp, would provide a much more realistic U.S. contribution to NATO than our
present one. Under this eonoept the present
prepositloned equipment far one armored
and one mechanized division could remain,
as could the tanks o! the armored division
'being withdrawn. This equipment would
provide the basis !or an early reinforcement
o! 2 armored and one mechanized division if
this were later required. Support forces left
In Europe should be those required to austerely support the two division force, maintain a drastically reduced number of stored
tactical nuclear weapons and maintain the
preposltloned equipment. Air squadrons In
West Germany should be those required to
tactically support the Corps force and accomplish forward strategic missions. The 3rd
Air Force In England should command all
air elements In Europe. Navy elements
should be commanded from afloat command
ships under the Atlantic Commander. Only
the Corps, division and one logistics comm!Uld headquarters should be left In Europe.
The corps should command all group forces
In Europe and be commanded by the Secretary o! Defense exercising direction through
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Depart ments of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
Length o! tours of military personnel assigned in Europe should be optional. For example, the mU!tary member should have a
choice of serving in Europe 15 months without his family or 48 months wltb his family.
Above all we must stop deluding ourselves that we can financially afford to
posture a truly effective conventional war
deterrent to the Soviet Army In Central
Europe. This force Is a representative one
at best and 4¥., divisions are actually no
more sufficient for the mission than 2 divisions. There Is no valid reason to continue
to accept our adverse European balance-ofpayments costs In pursuit o! the butterfly of conventional war capability In Central Europe. Russia could as soon defend
Mexico from a U.S. conventional attack. The
answer to Soviet attack In Western Europe
111lll of necessity be nuclear regardless of
whether we have 4 Y3 divisions or 2 divisions
stationed there. But with 2 dlvis!ons and a
smaller overall force we have more options
before having to resort to nuclear war to defend a large number of U .S. soldiers. True
flexible respnnse In Euroj~e calls !or either a
greatly Increased number of U.S. divisions
there, or a smaller number that could be
risked I! ..national necessity so dictated.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

